IMPERSONATION SCAMS: A FAMILIAR IDENTITY CAN STILL BE FAKE
Impersonation scams work by borrowing trust. The person contacting you may use the name, photograph, voice, job title, account, writing style or branding of someone you already know or recognise. The request may feel familiar enough that you stop checking.
That is the danger.
A familiar identity is not the same thing as a verified identity. A compromised account can be controlled by someone else. A copied profile can look genuine. A new phone number can belong to someone who knows enough about your family to sound convincing. A caller can know your name and still be a stranger.
The safest habit is simple:
VERIFY THE PERSON SEPARATELY.
Do not use the same message, account, phone number, profile or channel that created the request as the only evidence that the request is genuine.
BEFORE YOU BEGIN
This lesson is about a practical problem: someone appears to be a person or organisation you trust, but you are not yet sure who is actually behind the request.
The goal is not to become suspicious of everyone. The goal is to know when familiarity is being used as a substitute for proof.
1. WHAT IS AN IMPERSONATION SCAM?
An impersonation scam occurs when someone presents themselves as another person, organisation or trusted authority in order to influence your decision.
The impersonator may pretend to be:
- a parent, sibling, spouse, friend or colleague
- a bank or financial-service representative
- a company support agent
- a business owner or supplier
- a manager or senior executive
- a government or public-service representative
- a delivery company or service provider
- a recruiter or employer
- a social-media contact
- a person whose account has been compromised
The impersonation may be crude or highly convincing. The important question is not whether the identity looks familiar. The important question is whether you independently verified the person and the request.
2. WHY FAMILIARITY IS NOT PROOF
People naturally use recognition as a shortcut.
You see a familiar name. You recognise a profile photograph. The person knows your name. The writing style looks right. The caller knows details about your family. The account has old conversations. The message arrives from a number you have seen before.
None of these facts, by themselves, proves who is currently controlling the account or device.
A genuine person's account can be compromised. A profile can be copied. A phone can be lost. A number can change hands. A criminal can gather public information before contacting you.
Treat familiarity as a reason to recognise the person, not as the final proof that the current request is genuine.
3. THE CENTRAL RULE: VERIFY THE REQUEST, NOT JUST THE IDENTITY
Suppose a message really is from your friend.
That still does not automatically mean every request in the message is safe.
A compromised account may belong to the real person while the current request comes from an attacker. A genuine employee may have had their account taken over. A real organisation can also have a communication channel that you did not expect.
So there are two separate questions:
WHO IS THIS? WHAT ARE THEY ASKING ME TO DO?
For a consequential request, verify both.
4. WHEN SHOULD YOU STOP AND VERIFY SEPARATELY?
Independent verification becomes especially important when the request involves:
- sending money
- changing a bank account or payment destination
- sharing an OTP, PIN, password or recovery code
- sharing identity documents or sensitive personal information
- clicking a link to sign in
- installing an application
- changing account settings
- granting access to a device, account or business system
- buying gift cards, cryptocurrency or other value
- keeping the request secret
- acting immediately because of an emergency
The higher the consequence, the stronger your verification should be.
5. THE MOST IMPORTANT DISTINCTION: CONTACT CHANNEL VS VERIFICATION CHANNEL
If someone sends you a message through WhatsApp and asks for money, replying to the same WhatsApp account is not independent verification.
If a caller says they are from your bank and asks you to confirm an OTP, asking the caller whether they are really from the bank is not independent verification.
If a social-media account claiming to be support sends you a link, clicking that link to confirm the account is not independent verification.
The verification channel should be independent of the channel that created the request.
Examples:
- Call your relative using the number already saved in your phone.
- Contact the company through its official website or published contact details.
- Open your bank's official app yourself rather than following a link in the message.
- Speak to a colleague through an established workplace channel.
- Confirm a supplier change using contact details already stored in your business records.
6. EXAMPLE 1: “I AM USING A NEW NUMBER”
You receive a WhatsApp message:
“Hi, it is me. I lost my old phone. Save this new number. I urgently need ₦80,000. Please send it now and I will explain later.”
The profile photograph looks familiar. The person knows your name and mentions a recent family event.
Do not treat those details as proof.
A safer response is to stop the transaction and call the person's old number if it still works, contact another family member through a previously trusted channel, or use another established way to confirm the request.
Do not let the explanation about the lost phone become the reason you skip verification.
7. EXAMPLE 2: A FAMILIAR ACCOUNT MAKES AN UNUSUAL REQUEST
A friend's existing social-media or messaging account suddenly asks you for money, a gift card, cryptocurrency or sensitive information.
The account may genuinely belong to your friend.
That still does not prove the request came from your friend.
Use a separate channel you already trust. If you cannot verify the request, do not act simply because the account is familiar.
8. EXAMPLE 3: A “BANK OFFICER” CALLS YOU
Someone calls and says:
“We detected a problem with your account. I need the code that was just sent to your phone so I can secure the account.”
The caller may know your name, bank and some transaction information.
Do not provide the OTP or other authentication secret.
End the call and contact the bank using the official number on your card, official app or official website. Do not use a number supplied by the caller.
An authentication code is designed to help prove control of an account. It is not a tool for proving that the caller is genuine.
9. EXAMPLE 4: A “SUPPORT AGENT” CONTACTS YOU
A social-media account says it is official customer support and tells you:
“Your account has a security issue. Send your password and recovery code so we can fix it.”
Do not send the password or recovery code.
Open the service's official website or app yourself and use its published support route. If the service has an account-security page, start there.
A real support process should not turn an unsolicited social-media conversation into permission to reveal your authentication secrets.
10. EXAMPLE 5: A FAMILY EMERGENCY
A message appears to come from a relative:
“I am stranded. My phone is damaged. Please transfer money now. Do not call because I cannot answer.”
The emergency may be real. It may also be designed to prevent independent verification.
Use another route to confirm the situation. Call a number you already had. Contact another family member. Use an established family communication channel.
If the person is genuinely in danger, independent verification helps you get the right help instead of sending money to an attacker.
11. EXAMPLE 6: A COLLEAGUE OR BOSS REQUESTS A PAYMENT
You receive a message from a manager asking you to make an urgent payment or buy something immediately.
The name and profile picture are correct.
For a consequential business action, do not approve the request from the same message alone.
Use an established workplace channel, call a known number, or follow the organisation's existing approval process.
A familiar name should never replace a required approval control.
12. EXAMPLE 7: A SUPPLIER SAYS THEIR BANK DETAILS HAVE CHANGED
A known supplier sends a message saying:
“Please use this new account for all future payments.”
Do not simply update the beneficiary because the message came from a familiar account.
Confirm the change using contact information already stored in your records. If possible, speak to the supplier through a previously trusted channel and confirm the new details before payment.
A changed payment destination is a high-consequence event and deserves independent confirmation.
13. EXAMPLE 8: SOMEONE KNOWS PERSONAL DETAILS ABOUT YOU
An impersonator may know your workplace, hometown, relative's name, recent activity or other information.
This can make the conversation feel authentic.
But personal information is not proof of identity.
Information can come from public profiles, old posts, compromised accounts, leaked data, shared documents or other sources.
Ask yourself:
“How could this person know this information?”
Then ask the more important question:
“Have I independently verified who is making this request?”
14. VOICE, VIDEO AND PROFILE PHOTOS CAN ALSO MISLEAD
A voice that sounds familiar is not enough to approve a high-risk request.
A video call is not automatically proof of identity either.
Likewise, a profile photo, verified-looking account, logo or familiar username can be copied or abused.
Do not create a new rule that says “video is always safe” or “a familiar voice is always genuine.”
Instead, match the verification method to the consequence of the action.
15. URGENCY IS A VERIFICATION WARNING
Common pressure phrases include:
- “Send it now.”
- “Do not tell anyone.”
- “I only have a few minutes.”
- “My phone will go off.”
- “You are the only person who can help.”
- “If you do not act now, the account will be blocked.”
- “Keep this between us.”
Urgency does not prove fraud. A genuine emergency can be urgent.
But urgency should make you more deliberate about verification, not less.
When a request is urgent and consequential, create a pause before acting.
16. SECRECY IS ANOTHER WARNING SIGN
Be careful when someone tells you not to contact anyone else.
A legitimate request may sometimes require privacy, but an unexpected demand for secrecy removes the very people or channels that could help you verify the situation.
If the request involves money, credentials, identity information or account access, do not let secrecy prevent an independent check.
17. DO NOT REUSE THE SUSPECTED CHANNEL FOR VERIFICATION
This is one of the most common mistakes.
Bad verification:
“Are you really my brother?”
“Yes.”
“Okay.”
Bad verification:
“Are you really from the bank?”
“Yes. Send the OTP.”
Better verification:
Call your brother using the number already stored in your contacts.
Better verification:
Open the bank's official app or use the official phone number published by the bank.
The purpose of independent verification is to break the attacker's control over the conversation.
18. A SIMPLE FIVE-QUESTION IMPERSONATION TEST
Before acting on an unusual request, ask:
- WHO?
Who exactly is making the request?
- WHAT?
What exactly are they asking me to do?
- WHY?
Why is the request necessary?
- CHANNEL?
Am I verifying through the same channel that made the request?
- CONSEQUENCE?
What could happen if I am wrong?
If the request is consequential and you cannot answer these questions confidently, pause and verify separately.
19. HOW TO VERIFY A PERSON YOU ALREADY KNOW
Use a channel that existed before the suspicious request.
Examples:
- A phone number already saved in your contacts
- A previous trusted email address
- A known workplace extension
- Another family member
- An established business contact
- An official organisation website
- An official app
- A previously trusted support route
Avoid taking the verification contact details from the suspicious message itself.
20. HOW TO VERIFY AN ORGANISATION
If someone claims to represent a bank, company, school, government body, platform or service:
- Open the organisation's official website yourself.
- Find the published contact details.
- Use the official app where available.
- Check the relevant official support or account-security section.
- Do not rely on a phone number, link or email address supplied by the unexpected contact.
For regulated or registered organisations, relevant regulator or registration information can provide additional context, but it should not replace the appropriate official contact route for the specific request.
21. WHAT YOU SHOULD NEVER HAND OVER JUST TO “PROVE” WHO YOU ARE
Be especially careful with:
- passwords
- PINs
- OTPs and verification codes
- recovery codes
- wallet recovery phrases
- full account credentials
- security answers
- unrestricted remote access
- unnecessary identity documents
A request for one of these secrets is not made safer because the requester claims to be a friend, bank employee, support agent, manager or official.
22. WHAT IF THE PERSON REALLY IS WHO THEY CLAIM TO BE?
Independent verification is still useful.
Imagine your actual brother really did lose his phone and really does need help.
Calling his old number, contacting another family member or using another trusted route does not insult him. It protects both of you from acting on a false request.
The goal is not to distrust people.
The goal is to prevent an attacker from borrowing someone's identity to make you act.
23. WHAT IF YOU CANNOT VERIFY?
Do not guess.
Do not send a small amount “just to test.” Do not reveal one code “just this once.” Do not click the link because the account looks genuine. Do not install the application because the caller sounds convincing.
Pause the action until you can verify the person and request through an appropriate independent channel.
24. IF YOU ALREADY SENT MONEY OR SHARED INFORMATION
Act quickly.
If money was sent, contact your bank or payment provider through its official channel and report the transaction.
If an OTP, password or recovery information was disclosed, secure the affected account using the official account-security process and change compromised credentials where appropriate.
If sensitive personal information or an identity document was shared, document what was disclosed and consider the accounts or services that could be affected.
Preserve relevant messages, phone numbers, usernames, transaction references and timestamps before deleting evidence unnecessarily.
Do not continue negotiating with the suspected impersonator as your main recovery strategy.
25. COMMON MISTAKES
Mistake 1: “The profile picture is correct.” A profile picture is not independent proof.
Mistake 2: “The person knows private details.” Information can be obtained from many sources.
Mistake 3: “The account is old.” An old account can be compromised.
Mistake 4: “The caller ID showed the right organisation.” Caller identification information should not be treated as sufficient proof for a consequential request.
Mistake 5: “I called the number they sent me.” That is not independent verification if the suspected attacker supplied the number.
Mistake 6: “It was urgent, so I had no time.” Urgency is precisely when a short verification pause can prevent a serious mistake.
26. A PRACTICAL VERIFICATION ROUTINE
Use this sequence whenever a familiar identity makes an unusual request:
PAUSE Do not act while the pressure is highest.
IDENTIFY Write down who the person claims to be and what they want.
SEPARATE Move away from the channel that created the request.
VERIFY Use a trusted number, official website, official app or established contact route.
CONFIRM Check both the identity and the specific request.
ACT Only proceed when the evidence supports the action.
RECORD For important incidents or changes, keep the relevant evidence and confirmation.
27. YOUR IMPERSONATION CHECKLIST
Before acting on an unusual request, ask:
□ Is this request normal for this person or organisation? □ Does it involve money, credentials, identity information or account access? □ Am I relying only on the name, photo, voice or account? □ Did the request come through an unexpected or changed channel? □ Have I contacted the person separately? □ Did I use contact details I already trusted? □ Did I verify the specific request, not only the identity? □ Is anyone pressuring me to hurry or keep it secret? □ What happens if I am wrong? □ Have I preserved evidence if something already appears suspicious?
28. THE HABIT TO REMEMBER
When familiarity is being used as proof, stop and separate the verification.
PAUSE → IDENTIFY → SEPARATE → VERIFY → CONFIRM → ACT
You do not need to assume everyone is an attacker.
You need a process that still protects you when the person behind a familiar identity is not the person you expected.
FINAL PRINCIPLE
A familiar name can be copied. A familiar account can be compromised. A familiar voice can be imitated. A familiar photograph can be reused. A familiar organisation can be impersonated.
Trust should come from independent verification, not appearance alone.
